Wednesday, February 22, 2006
Website of the day
This is my favourite website of today, maybe of the week... Click on 'Future War' and scroll through these amazing devices. Those of you who are professional military men tell me that you do not need the 'Gyro-Electric Destroyer' right now. Write to Gordon Brown demanding that funds be made available for this incredible machine. And while we're at it we might as well get a couple of 'Submarine-Land Dreadnoughts' for the Navy (or the Army? Good for both!) and the 'Jumping Jack Artillery Tower' also looks very handy.
Monday, February 20, 2006
Defence Secretary at King's
Today John Reid, Defence Minister, gave a speech at KCL called 'The Uneven Playing Field' which we've videoed and hopefully can make available to our on-line students. The gist of the speech was that criticism of the British military ought to be balanced by an appreciation of the enormous good works it has done and continues to do. The immediate context of the speech, for those of you not following the UK media is this. The deeper context, however, said Reid, is that the level of public understanding of the military has fallen drastically over the last decades as the proportion of the population with military experience has declined to a small fraction. What we have is an 'uneven playing field' in which our troops are highly constrained by a ubiquitous scandal-mongering global media in a battle against a totally unrestrained and media-savvy terrorist enemy--I'm paraphrasing. He went on to argue that war was being transformed by three things, as I recall:
- The nature of the 'enemy' has changed; in the past our enemies wore uniforms and had aims and structures which we could understand; generally we shared with our opponents certain cultural conventions and norms; this is no longer the case.
- The enemy 'uses our freedoms against us'--they employ asymmetric techniques 'making our strengths into our weaknesses'.
- The rate of technological change has shifted seismically; we now have 'real-time media scrutiny of war' so that small tactical actions in the field can within minutes or hours be shown on television and debated in Parliament.
None of this is particularly new, actually. Nonetheless, it was a very effective tour d'horizon of the dilemmas of contemporary warfare. Which is why I feel somewhat disappointed by it. At times it sounded like an impassioned plea for the British public, more precisely the British media, to be fairer towards and more understanding of the unprecedented pressures under which the Army is now operating. Hear, hear, I say--I couldn't agree more. But this was the Minister of Defence, after all, not some random academic. I was rather hoping at the end to hear how much political capital the government would expend to defend their own soldiery; how far would he risk his own political neck? He didn't say. In fact what he said was something like this: 'we should be more understanding but when crimes are apparently committed we need to prosecute and hold to account...' (This strikes me as logically similar to the government's weaselly response to the furore over publication of cartoons depicting Muhammed: 'yes you have freedom of speech BUT you shouldn't exercise it when it offends people [in which case why have it?].')
In other words, the message to the British Army was, it seemed to me, 'yes, we hear your concerns and we appreciate what you're doing but if you make a mistake you're still toast.' The speech was videoed and I believe we are going to try and post it on the website. I'd be interested to hear what the rest of you make of it.
Monday, February 13, 2006
Well this isn't very good...
[This is an old post which I'd started on earlier and saved in my drafts folder. It's a bit outdated now but I think I'll post it anyway as there are still a few things relevant which you may find interesting. I've also linked to a number of articles which are worth reading for those interested in some dilemmas of contemporary warfare.]
Many of you will of course have heard no end of this already but I can't help remarking on it as it speaks to a number of things which I've been writing/thinking about lately.
First, it helps bring into focus one of the things which bothers me about this otherwise very good critique of the US in Iraq which has been doing the rounds: the implicit message that whereas the British Army has a sort of omni-cultural sensitivity that allows it to be more flexible in stability ops, the US Army is by contrast culturally deaf, if not ignorant, and as a result is hamfisted in its relations with the local populace. Don't get me wrong, there's a kernel of truth here--but it really ought not to be overstated. As we see after a day in the hot sun having home-made hand grenades and used hypodermics pitched at you by a braying mob British troops are not immune to the desire to lash out.
Which brings me to my second, somewhat more general, complaint about current events in Iraq. I find it increasingly difficult to say much about Iraq with the confidence of thinking I know all, or at least most, of the facts. There's a paradox here: we can see what has happened in these cases which gives us the illusion that we understand what is going on. The truth is that we do not. The recent episode is a case in point. Were the soldiers we saw part of the snatch squad we saw earlier in the clip or just opportunistic bullies? Were the guys they captured the riot's ringleaders or just the least fleet of foot? Was there an officer present? Where? A subaltern or a company commander. It's impossible to know from the clip. But it's crucial to understanding the event in context. I can fairly easily construct a hypothetical scenario around this which is consistent with everything on the tape and with which I have no great problems. British army position is continually harassed and attacked by organized local youths. Levels of violence are below that which would justify shooting back. But local police do nothing to stop/prevent riots (in fact, may be the among the main organizers) or capture ringleaders. Sergeant hatches cunning plan to snatch what he thinks are the most regular participants and give them a hiding. Officer says, I didn't hear that; I shall be in my tent. (No doubt this is why I should never hold a commission). On the other hand, you could construct an equally consistent narrative: soldiers hot, pissed-off, jerks who decide to take their frustrations out on a group of innocent local boys. The trouble is knowing which is closer to the case: generally what happens is that these things confirm and deepen whatever opinion the viewer had before they saw the clip. The clip from a year ago which showed a marine in Fallujah shooting a wounded insurgent in the head was even more marked in showing this contrast.
Third, I find it interesting that what has really upset people about the clip is not the beating being unleashed but the commentary by the soldier filming it. I recollect this old opinion piece by Andrew Marr (not someone I normally would link to) which captures something important, I think. Technology, specifically digital cameras and the internet, are changing something very fundamental about the way the Western world at least experiences war. As Marr puts it:
But warfare has depended for centuries on a rampart of silence, a wall of willed
incomprehension, between civilians at home and those killing. In a small way,
the arrival of digital photography has broken through that wall.
In the past, war happened 'over there' and while dreadful things were done, sometimes by one's own side, one tended not to hear about it until well after the fact, if ever. Now, the incomprehension remains but the wall is gone.
Many of you will of course have heard no end of this already but I can't help remarking on it as it speaks to a number of things which I've been writing/thinking about lately.
First, it helps bring into focus one of the things which bothers me about this otherwise very good critique of the US in Iraq which has been doing the rounds: the implicit message that whereas the British Army has a sort of omni-cultural sensitivity that allows it to be more flexible in stability ops, the US Army is by contrast culturally deaf, if not ignorant, and as a result is hamfisted in its relations with the local populace. Don't get me wrong, there's a kernel of truth here--but it really ought not to be overstated. As we see after a day in the hot sun having home-made hand grenades and used hypodermics pitched at you by a braying mob British troops are not immune to the desire to lash out.
Which brings me to my second, somewhat more general, complaint about current events in Iraq. I find it increasingly difficult to say much about Iraq with the confidence of thinking I know all, or at least most, of the facts. There's a paradox here: we can see what has happened in these cases which gives us the illusion that we understand what is going on. The truth is that we do not. The recent episode is a case in point. Were the soldiers we saw part of the snatch squad we saw earlier in the clip or just opportunistic bullies? Were the guys they captured the riot's ringleaders or just the least fleet of foot? Was there an officer present? Where? A subaltern or a company commander. It's impossible to know from the clip. But it's crucial to understanding the event in context. I can fairly easily construct a hypothetical scenario around this which is consistent with everything on the tape and with which I have no great problems. British army position is continually harassed and attacked by organized local youths. Levels of violence are below that which would justify shooting back. But local police do nothing to stop/prevent riots (in fact, may be the among the main organizers) or capture ringleaders. Sergeant hatches cunning plan to snatch what he thinks are the most regular participants and give them a hiding. Officer says, I didn't hear that; I shall be in my tent. (No doubt this is why I should never hold a commission). On the other hand, you could construct an equally consistent narrative: soldiers hot, pissed-off, jerks who decide to take their frustrations out on a group of innocent local boys. The trouble is knowing which is closer to the case: generally what happens is that these things confirm and deepen whatever opinion the viewer had before they saw the clip. The clip from a year ago which showed a marine in Fallujah shooting a wounded insurgent in the head was even more marked in showing this contrast.
Third, I find it interesting that what has really upset people about the clip is not the beating being unleashed but the commentary by the soldier filming it. I recollect this old opinion piece by Andrew Marr (not someone I normally would link to) which captures something important, I think. Technology, specifically digital cameras and the internet, are changing something very fundamental about the way the Western world at least experiences war. As Marr puts it:
But warfare has depended for centuries on a rampart of silence, a wall of willed
incomprehension, between civilians at home and those killing. In a small way,
the arrival of digital photography has broken through that wall.
In the past, war happened 'over there' and while dreadful things were done, sometimes by one's own side, one tended not to hear about it until well after the fact, if ever. Now, the incomprehension remains but the wall is gone.
Wednesday, February 08, 2006
Inkblotto
There's been a lot of talk recently about 'how to win in Iraq'. A recent article in the Telegraph discusses the ink blot strategy. Have a look and go read the original piece in Foreign Affairs if you haven't already.
My first reaction was slightly harsh: why are you saying this now 2+ years after getting into this war!
Once I'd gotten over being irritated and settled down I found that I agreed with almost everything he had to say.
I still agree with almost all of it but not withuot reservations.
The strategy appears to rest heavily on the idea of that the British won in Malaya not by killing, capturing or driving out the communists but by taking control of bits Malaya in which they made life so good that people didn't want to fight the British any more and then expanding these bits like 'ink blots'. If we copy this strategy, so the argument goes, we can win in Iraq. First, I'm not so sure that this is really what the British did in Malaya. Yes, there were protected villages, yes there was tight coordination between civil and military action, but at the end of the day the British Army also went out into the jungle found, fought and killed or captured the insurgents. It wasn't a welfare project, in other words. For that matter Britain didn't have a lot of money in those days to give away. What I'm getting at, I think, is when people say 'Clear and Hold' is the answer, or 'Search and Destroy' is all we need to do I think: no, you need to do both and be sensitive to where and how the two interact. It's a bit like the manoeuvre vs attrition debate which often devolves into something quite primitive: manoeuvre good, attrition bad. But it's not either or. You can't manoeuvre withuot a holding force and unless you plan on holding indefinitely you've got to do some attacking.
The second thing that bothers me is the implicit assumption that the insurgents are fighting for better socio-economic conditions rather than something more ideological or religious. In Malaya the insurgents were fighting for communism and, as they were mostly Chinese, arguably for ethno-nationalist reasons. In Vietnam the same could be said of the VC. I find it hard to believe that someone in Iraq decides to become a suicide bomber because the water and electricity supply in Basrah is erratic. I understand that the recruitment of activists follows a linear pattern of disillusionment, isolation, subversion to becoming a terrorist actor and that we should be focussing on the first stage not the latter. However, it's not at all clear how one can address 'disillusionment' in the Muslim world. If four relatively well off and materially priveleged British muslims set off down this path culminating in the murder of 50 of their compatriots then what sense does it make to say that it is the state of the Iraqi infrastructure which is driving the insurgency there. It's got to be something else.
Moreover, the ink blot doesn't say anything about the neighbouring countries. If all of Iraq was an ink blot then you'd still have to come up with something to do about Syria and Iran not to mention the rest of the Middle East. The Coalition has to be a lot more globally-minded and less individually state-centred. Iraq is a battle in a larger war.
The third thing that makes me apprehensive is that going on the defensive will leave the non-ink blot areas of Iraq all the more easy for insurgents to organize and plan attacks in ink-blot land. What are the chances of really securing these blots? The Israelis have been trying to make something like this work for ages; up until the point they started separating their ink-blot physically witha fence they weren't having much success--and attacks still get through with the fence; moreover, the Iraqi insurgents are larger, more motivated and better armed than the Palestinians, it seems to me. We're not proposing to fence off parts of Iraq from other parts. On the contrary we're trying to encourage a federal state. So it is quite posible that the blots will shrink rather than expand.
Essentially I fear that the ink-blot strategy is a sign that there is insufficent will to win. Lately, I keep coming back to what Kissinger said about failure in Vietnam.
'We would not have recognized victory if it were staring us in the face, because we did not know what our objectives were.'
I don't think the real problem is the tactics on the ground in Iraq (which is not to say that there haven't been a lot of mistakes made). It's bigger than that. It's hard to come up with a strategy when you haven't got a clear idea what you want. Giving clear direction on some basic points would be useful.
Who's the enemy?
What do you want from them? How much do you want it?
What do they want from you? How much are you prepared to suffer from not letting them have it?
My first reaction was slightly harsh: why are you saying this now 2+ years after getting into this war!
Once I'd gotten over being irritated and settled down I found that I agreed with almost everything he had to say.
I still agree with almost all of it but not withuot reservations.
The strategy appears to rest heavily on the idea of that the British won in Malaya not by killing, capturing or driving out the communists but by taking control of bits Malaya in which they made life so good that people didn't want to fight the British any more and then expanding these bits like 'ink blots'. If we copy this strategy, so the argument goes, we can win in Iraq. First, I'm not so sure that this is really what the British did in Malaya. Yes, there were protected villages, yes there was tight coordination between civil and military action, but at the end of the day the British Army also went out into the jungle found, fought and killed or captured the insurgents. It wasn't a welfare project, in other words. For that matter Britain didn't have a lot of money in those days to give away. What I'm getting at, I think, is when people say 'Clear and Hold' is the answer, or 'Search and Destroy' is all we need to do I think: no, you need to do both and be sensitive to where and how the two interact. It's a bit like the manoeuvre vs attrition debate which often devolves into something quite primitive: manoeuvre good, attrition bad. But it's not either or. You can't manoeuvre withuot a holding force and unless you plan on holding indefinitely you've got to do some attacking.
The second thing that bothers me is the implicit assumption that the insurgents are fighting for better socio-economic conditions rather than something more ideological or religious. In Malaya the insurgents were fighting for communism and, as they were mostly Chinese, arguably for ethno-nationalist reasons. In Vietnam the same could be said of the VC. I find it hard to believe that someone in Iraq decides to become a suicide bomber because the water and electricity supply in Basrah is erratic. I understand that the recruitment of activists follows a linear pattern of disillusionment, isolation, subversion to becoming a terrorist actor and that we should be focussing on the first stage not the latter. However, it's not at all clear how one can address 'disillusionment' in the Muslim world. If four relatively well off and materially priveleged British muslims set off down this path culminating in the murder of 50 of their compatriots then what sense does it make to say that it is the state of the Iraqi infrastructure which is driving the insurgency there. It's got to be something else.
Moreover, the ink blot doesn't say anything about the neighbouring countries. If all of Iraq was an ink blot then you'd still have to come up with something to do about Syria and Iran not to mention the rest of the Middle East. The Coalition has to be a lot more globally-minded and less individually state-centred. Iraq is a battle in a larger war.
The third thing that makes me apprehensive is that going on the defensive will leave the non-ink blot areas of Iraq all the more easy for insurgents to organize and plan attacks in ink-blot land. What are the chances of really securing these blots? The Israelis have been trying to make something like this work for ages; up until the point they started separating their ink-blot physically witha fence they weren't having much success--and attacks still get through with the fence; moreover, the Iraqi insurgents are larger, more motivated and better armed than the Palestinians, it seems to me. We're not proposing to fence off parts of Iraq from other parts. On the contrary we're trying to encourage a federal state. So it is quite posible that the blots will shrink rather than expand.
Essentially I fear that the ink-blot strategy is a sign that there is insufficent will to win. Lately, I keep coming back to what Kissinger said about failure in Vietnam.
'We would not have recognized victory if it were staring us in the face, because we did not know what our objectives were.'
I don't think the real problem is the tactics on the ground in Iraq (which is not to say that there haven't been a lot of mistakes made). It's bigger than that. It's hard to come up with a strategy when you haven't got a clear idea what you want. Giving clear direction on some basic points would be useful.
Who's the enemy?
What do you want from them? How much do you want it?
What do they want from you? How much are you prepared to suffer from not letting them have it?
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