Charge of the Professors

A PhD student in the department gave me a copy of this article this morning 'Officers with PhDs Advising War Effort.' Have a read.

Gen. David H. Petraeus, the new U.S. commander in Iraq, is assembling a small band of warrior-intellectuals -- including a quirky Australian anthropologist, a Princeton economist who is the son of a former U.S. attorney general and a military expert on the Vietnam War sharply critical of its top commanders -- in an eleventh-hour effort to reverse the downward trend in the Iraq war.

Army officers tend to refer to the group as "Petraeus guys." They are smart colonels who have been noticed by Petraeus, and who make up one of the most selective clubs in the world: military officers with doctorates from top-flight universities and combat experience in Iraq.

Essentially, the Army is turning the war over to its dissidents, who have criticized the way the service has operated there the past three years, and is letting them try to wage the war their way.

"Their role is crucial if we are to reverse the effects of four years of conventional mind-set fighting an unconventional war," said a Special Forces colonel who knows some of the officers.

I have been lucky enough to get to know two of these 'Petraeus guys', Kilcullen and McMaster, a very little bit--which is more than enough to be deeply impressed by their clarity and insight about the situation we find ourselves in in Iraq and dedication and determination to find a solution. I am reminded of Napoleon's maxims:

Maxim 6--A retreat, however skillful the manoeuvres, will always produce an injurious moral effect on the army, since by losing the chances of success yourself you throw them into the hands of the enemy.

Maxim 15--in giving battle a general should regard it as his first duty to maintain the honour and glory of his arms. To spare his troops should be but a secondary consideration. But the same determination and perseverance which promote the former object are the best means of securing the latter. In a retreat you lose, in addition to the honour of your arms, more men than in two battles. For this reason you should never despair while there remain brave men around the colours...

I've no doubt of the seriousness of the consequences of defeat in Iraq and I'm apprehensive of the psychological momentum which will be lost to us (and gained by the other side in equal measure, as Napoleon points out). It has been argued by many that we should get out of Iraq so that we can avert defeat in Afghanistan by devoting more resources there. It seems just as likely to me, however, that having won in Iraq the resources of the global insurgency will shift to Afghanistan with far greater alacrity and enthusiasm than we will. In other words, I really, really want the 'surge' to work and if anyone can find a plausible solution it is these 'Petraeus guys'.

Unfortunately, the chances of success in Iraq are pretty remote. So this part of the article concerns me 'Essentially, the Army is turning the war over to its dissidents, who have criticized the way the service has operated there the past three years, and is letting them try to wage the war their way.' Iraq is a hot potato and when the music stops who will be left holding it? Probably not the guys who bollocksed it up in the first place, but the critical people who might have done it right given the chance. The Charge of the Professors looks a little like the Charge of the [too little, too late] Light Brigade. Ever heard the old adage 'Success has a hundred fathers but failure is an orphan'? If I were Petraeus that's what would be at the back of my mind right now.