On my way home yesterday I noticed this letter in The Times. As an air power skeptic I've sometimes toyed with similar idea. So, why not? Why not disband the RAF?
This is an interesting debate, part of which is played out routinely in my office. Indeed, as I type this, within my field of vision over my right shoulder I can see the entire strategic airlift planning team for UK Defence. The fact of the matter is that the RAF's role is much broader than fighter and bomber. The strategic reach required to enable an expeditionary foreign policy is predicated upon the logistical implications of moving stuff about. Often at short notice. Whilst historically 95%+ of all military movements (in terms of deadweight) has been moved by sea, becasue of very good tactical, resourcing and planning reasons, an aweful lot of stuff goes by air. Indeed, this ratio is leaning in favour of air as platforms such as the Antonof IL76 and the C-17 make themselves available. In addition to its figher/bomber roles, the RAF mans, manages and maintains much of the UK Defence strategic airlift capability. The other services do not have the wherewithal to conduct this task (much more important thigs to do) and there are very real constraints to using commercial lift. Note that a fair slice of the strategic airbridge is commercial, however, because of various factors including commercial appetite to do so and UK Defence policies on force protection (especially the fitment of Defensive Aids Suites etc), the are parts of the airbridge that can currently only be covered by mil assets. So, as it happens, the RAF is not utterly, utterly useless. Another side to this debate is the aging assertion that we could organise our Armed Forces along the lines of the US Marine Corps, which, amonst other things, has its own air-arm that was rumoured to be the envy of our own infantry. However, any apparent Close Support capability gap may well be closing fast now that the AH programme has been delvered. Now, whether we need a Navy or not is another interesting debate that we have in our office from time to time. Oh, how my RN colleagues start flashing when I hook them with that one. What do we think about the nuclear debate for example? (note that much of the RN inventry is in support of the maintenance of the nuclear deterrence).
But don't listen to me, check out what the RAF thinks the future holds:
Just made it to Paris when I read the title of this one David. I nearly choked on my croissant. Other than a some embarrassing looks from the Parisian couple across from me you'll be glad to know I went on to survive breakfast.
Mr. Need’s argument seems less applicable to the USAF who retains a significant strategic role so I’ll lend support to my RAF brothers/sisters. Not that it’s needed; this is an argument they’ve successfully dealt with for some time now. In fact Colin Gray’s article in one of our current texts, The Interregnum, makes mention of this: ‘had Britain’s RAF not resisted successfully the pressures in the 1920’s against maintaining service independence , its Army -oriented counterfactual alternative might well have been fatally overcommitted to the protection of the BEF in 1940”(Cox, 181)
Gaining and maintaining control of airspace is an integral part of most modern conflict. As alluded to by Gray, it was lack of air control that prevented Hitler from invading the UK homeland. Without command of the skies several activities become limited, not least of all support to the ground fight. Strategic airlift, which Nick mentions, is another. My Predators would have a hard time protecting coalition ground forces in combat if they were being easily (and I assure you it would be easy) picked off by enemy aircraft.
The best way to ensure air superiority is a priority and sufficiently looked after is to give exclusive command of the Air Component to an Airman (JFACC or CFACC in today‘s terminology). If you tie airpower exclusively to the ground war you run risk of losing the larger air war which in turn limit’s the campaign as a whole.
Judging by the Letters to the Editor page of today's The Times (30 Sep 06), you're not the only one to nearly choke on their croissant when they read Richard Need's piece.
Particularly interesting letter from a retd Flt Lt who banged on about sea-basing, flat-tops and the littoral. I may be wrong but I think Afghanistan might fall slightly outside of that particular template.
Andrew
Great summary, I thought. Thanks.
The trouble with defence assumptions is that they're just that. Assumptions. And the even greater trouble with defence assumption is that they all feature a 'within resources' caveat.
The US would do well to consider this as well. Consolidate. If it were a private company it would have to trim the replication. OK, the Airforce controls a lot of nukes... so, pushing buttons is not so difficult, even the navy can do it from beneath the waves! Consolidate. trim the fat.
Reading ahead to the next unit on Liberalism, there's some interesting reading in the Civ Mil Relations part about the value of maintaining inter-service rivalry. Despite the obvious inefficiencies which are inherent in multi-service armed forces, inter-service rivalry is a useful control measure for keeping the mil leadership (which is incresingly of a higher quality than that of civ/govt) otherwise distracted from non mil business and firmly in their box.
8 comments:
I'm guessing Need is an Army or Royal Navy officer....
This is an interesting debate, part of which is played out routinely in my office. Indeed, as I type this, within my field of vision over my right shoulder I can see the entire strategic airlift planning team for UK Defence.
The fact of the matter is that the RAF's role is much broader than fighter and bomber. The strategic reach required to enable an expeditionary foreign policy is predicated upon the logistical implications of moving stuff about. Often at short notice. Whilst historically 95%+ of all military movements (in terms of deadweight) has been moved by sea, becasue of very good tactical, resourcing and planning reasons, an aweful lot of stuff goes by air. Indeed, this ratio is leaning in favour of air as platforms such as the Antonof IL76 and the C-17 make themselves available. In addition to its figher/bomber roles, the RAF mans, manages and maintains much of the UK Defence strategic airlift capability. The other services do not have the wherewithal to conduct this task (much more important thigs to do) and there are very real constraints to using commercial lift. Note that a fair slice of the strategic airbridge is commercial, however, because of various factors including commercial appetite to do so and UK Defence policies on force protection (especially the fitment of Defensive Aids Suites etc), the are parts of the airbridge that can currently only be covered by mil assets. So, as it happens, the RAF is not utterly, utterly useless.
Another side to this debate is the aging assertion that we could organise our Armed Forces along the lines of the US Marine Corps, which, amonst other things, has its own air-arm that was rumoured to be the envy of our own infantry. However, any apparent Close Support capability gap may well be closing fast now that the AH programme has been delvered.
Now, whether we need a Navy or not is another interesting debate that we have in our office from time to time. Oh, how my RN colleagues start flashing when I hook them with that one. What do we think about the nuclear debate for example? (note that much of the RN inventry is in support of the maintenance of the nuclear deterrence).
But don't listen to me, check out what the RAF thinks the future holds:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/organisation/raffuture_1.html
IL76:
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/il76/il761.html
Antonov:
http://www.antonov.com/index.html;jsessionid=a3Z3FMD_B41_
C17:
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/c17/
Just made it to Paris when I read the title of this one David. I nearly choked on my croissant. Other than a some embarrassing looks from the Parisian couple across from me you'll be glad to know I went on to survive breakfast.
Mr. Need’s argument seems less applicable to the USAF who retains a significant strategic role so I’ll lend support to my RAF brothers/sisters. Not that it’s needed; this is an argument they’ve successfully dealt with for some time now. In fact Colin Gray’s article in one of our current texts, The Interregnum, makes mention of this: ‘had Britain’s RAF not resisted successfully the pressures in the 1920’s against maintaining service independence , its Army -oriented counterfactual alternative might well have been fatally overcommitted to the protection of the BEF in 1940”(Cox, 181)
Gaining and maintaining control of airspace is an integral part of most modern conflict. As alluded to by Gray, it was lack of air control that prevented Hitler from invading the UK homeland. Without command of the skies several activities become limited, not least of all support to the ground fight. Strategic airlift, which Nick mentions, is another. My Predators would have a hard time protecting coalition ground forces in combat if they were being easily (and I assure you it would be easy) picked off by enemy aircraft.
The best way to ensure air superiority is a priority and sufficiently looked after is to give exclusive command of the Air Component to an Airman (JFACC or CFACC in today‘s terminology). If you tie airpower exclusively to the ground war you run risk of losing the larger air war which in turn limit’s the campaign as a whole.
Sean
Related to this is the growing, albeit slowly, argument for a Space Force separate from the USAF. Not sure if were ready for that one.
Sean
Judging by the Letters to the Editor page of today's The Times (30 Sep 06), you're not the only one to nearly choke on their croissant when they read Richard Need's piece.
Particularly interesting letter from a retd Flt Lt who banged on about sea-basing, flat-tops and the littoral. I may be wrong but I think Afghanistan might fall slightly outside of that particular template.
Andrew
Great summary, I thought. Thanks.
The trouble with defence assumptions is that they're just that. Assumptions. And the even greater trouble with defence assumption is that they all feature a 'within resources' caveat.
Nick
I'm sure that the present Govt could see merit in that suggestion. You should get a job at Whitehall, you'd go far!
The US would do well to consider this as well. Consolidate. If it were a private company it would have to trim the replication. OK, the Airforce controls a lot of nukes... so, pushing buttons is not so difficult, even the navy can do it from beneath the waves! Consolidate. trim the fat.
Reading ahead to the next unit on Liberalism, there's some interesting reading in the Civ Mil Relations part about the value of maintaining inter-service rivalry. Despite the obvious inefficiencies which are inherent in multi-service armed forces, inter-service rivalry is a useful control measure for keeping the mil leadership (which is incresingly of a higher quality than that of civ/govt) otherwise distracted from non mil business and firmly in their box.
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